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NOTE
First Amendment Protection for
Newsgathering: Applying the Actual
Malice Standard to Recovery of
Damages for Intrusion
BYMERPrr JONES*
Courts are split over whether to allow plaintiffs who claim
journalists have intruded upon their privacy' in gathering news to
recover damages based on injury from publication of the intrusively
gathered information. While the First Amendment restricts damages
available for reputational torts,2 the United States Supreme Court has
held that such constitutional protection does not apply to intrusive
* Merrit Jones is a litigation associate at Cooper, White & Cooper, LLP in San
Francisco. The author received a J.D. from University of California, Hastings College of
the Law in 2000 and a B.S. in journalism from Northwestern University in 1993. Prior to
law school, she worked as a newspaper reporter and editor. The author wishes to thank
her parents, Roy and Joan Jones, and her husband, Matthew Harrison, for their
encouragement and support.
1. The privacy tort of intrusion is defined as the intentional invasion "upon the
solicitude or seclusion of another or his private concerns.., if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1977).
Intrusion is one of four privacy torts identified by William L. Prosser in his article,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 381, 389 (1960), and later adopted by the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A-E (1977). The other privacy torts are public disclosure of
private facts, publicity putting a person in a false light, and misappropriation of a person's
name or likeness. See id.
2. For example, in order to recover any amount of damages for libel, a public figure
must show that the press published a false fact with actual malice, or knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for truth or falsity. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964). A private individual only has to show actual malice in order to recover
presumed or punitive damages. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-350
(1974).
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newsgathering.3 The rationale is that intrusion claims do not directly
involve protected speech.4  The California Supreme Court has
justified this absence of constitutional protection against intrusion
claims by stating that the intrusion tort "does not subject the press to
liability for the contents of its publications."' In light of the nature of
many intrusion claims, however, it seems likely that an increasing
number of plaintiffs seek to recover damages from the publication of
intrusively gathered information rather than the underlying
intrusion.6 In fact, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has explicitly
held that such publication can enhance damages for intrusion without
offending the First Amendment:
No interest protected by the First Amendment is adversely
affected by permitting damages for intrusion to be enhanced by
the fact of later publication of the information that the publisher
improperly acquired. Assessing damages for the additional
emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff when the wrongfully
acquired data are purveyed to the multitude chills intrusive acts.
It does not chill freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment.7
As a result, intrusion claims not only frequently succeed where
reputational torts fail, they allow recovery of damages for the same
types of injury, making them increasingly popular among a public fed
up with the press.8
3. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,682-83 (1972) (plurality opinion).
4. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. App. 1996) ("Unlike the privacy
torts based on public disclosure and false light privacy, the intrusion tort does not
implicate the First Amendment concerns addressed in [earlier cases].").
5. See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 240 (1998). Accord
Marich v. QRZ Media, 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 317 (1999) ("The same deference is not due,
however, when the issue is not the media's right to publish or broadcast what they choose,
but their right to intrude into secluded areas or conversations in the pursuit of publishable
material.").
6. See, e.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1488 (1986)
(holding that a widow could recover, based on trespass and intrusion claims, for emotional
distress caused by broadcast of her husband's dying moments); Sanders v. American
Broadcasting Co., 20 Cal. 4th 907, 919 (1999) (holding that telephone psychic could
recover for intrusion where he could be seen and overheard by co-workers).
7. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,250 (9th Cir. 1971).
8. "Intrusion claims related to newsgathering appear to be the most active and
troublesome area of litigation, principally because of the lesser degree of constitutional
protection accorded to the newsgathering process." Dennis F. Hernandez, Libel &
Newsgathering Litigation-Getting & Reporting the News: Current Developments in
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Allowing intrusion plaintiffs to recover for injury from
publication, without meeting the heightened burden of proof required
for torts based on publication, undermines constitutional protection
for the press. The United States Supreme Court attempted to avoid
such a result in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell when it held that a public
figure could not recover for emotional distress, based on the
magazine's publication of a parody of him, without satisfying the
constitutional standards for libel.9 Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal applied this principle in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. to bar recovery, based on intrusive newsgathering
methods, for damage to a grocery chain's reputation stemming from a
report on its food-handling practices.0
This note argues that allowing intrusion plaintiffs to recover for
damages from publication, without satisfying the heightened standard
of proof required for reputational torts, circumvents First
Amendment protection for the press. Part I traces the progression of
cases holding that generally applicable laws can restrict
newsgathering. Part II describes disparate cases, starting with Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, that hold that the First Amendment restricts
recovery of any damages caused by publication, regardless of the
nature of the claim. It suggests one way to reconcile these conflicting
principles would be to require intrusion plaintiffs who seek to recover
for injury from publication to show that journalists in the pursuit of
newsworthy information acted with actual malice - knowledge or
reckless disregard that their intrusion violated an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy.
I. Allowing Publication or Broadcast to Enhance Damages for
Intrusive Newsgathering
A. Journalists Are Not Immune From Generally Applicable Laws
Restricting Newsgathering
The United States Supreme Court has not definitively held
whether the First Amendment provides any protection for
newsgathering. The Court has held that where generally applicable
laws" restrict newsgathering, the First Amendment does not privilege
Privacy Litigation, 523 PLI/PAT 263, 263 (1998).
9. 485 U.S. 46,56 (1988).
10. See Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 522-24.
11. Generally applicable laws are those that apply to the general public rather than
target a particular group, such as the press, and whose purposes are unrelated to
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the press. 2 For example, the Court held in Branzburg v. Hayes that
journalists are not immune from the legal duty to testify before a
grand jury concerning information they have gathered. 3 The press
receives "no special immunity from the application of general laws"
and "no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."'4
"[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a
constitutional right of special access to information not available to
the public generally."' 5  At the same time, however, the Court
recognized in dicta that gathering news is essential to publishing it,
conceding that "newsgathering is not without its First Amendment
protections.' 6 "[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated."' 7  Justice Stewart
apparently thought such protection should suffice to guide the
majority to a different result about whether the reporter could be
compelled to testify. In his dissent, he emphasized that "without
freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be
impermissibly compromised.'
8
Though Branzburg is often cited for the proposition that the
press lacks a newsgathering privilege, it did not concern
newsgathering per se but whether a reporter must testify before a
grand jury concerning confidential sources. 9 The Court recognized
its decision implicated newsgathering because it would affect the
ability of reporters to get information by promising confidentiality to
sources who might become the subjects of grand jury investigations.The Court's holding was narrow: By one vote, it refused to "grant
restriction of the press. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-83.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937), which
held that the Associated Press was not exempt from complying with the National Labor
Relations Act).
15. Id- at 684.
16. Id- at 681.
17. Id
18. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 668. The case involved three challenges to grand jury subpoenas:
Branzburg, a Louisville reporter, declined to testify before a state grand jury in order to
protect people he had seen possessing marijuana or making hashish while investigating a
story on drug activities. See id. In addition, a television reporter who had spent time at a
Black Panthers headquarters and a New York Times reporter who interviewed Black
Panther leaders also refused to appear before grand juries. See id
20. See id
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newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy."2
Although the Court had alluded in dicta to constitutional protection
for newsgathering, it did not reveal when such protection might
apply.
Subsequent decisions upheld the principle that generally
applicable laws could restrict newsgathering. For example, the Court
held in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. that "generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
report the news."'  "[E]nforcement of such general laws against the
press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to
enforcement against other persons or organizations."'24  Cohen
concerned whether a plaintiff could recover damages for a reporter's
breach of a promise of confidentiality.' The majority cast Cohen as a
newsgathering case because the reporter had promised his source
anonymity in order to obtain information.26 Four dissenting justices
viewed the decision as impinging on the right to publish, however,
because it punished the newspaper for printing the source's name.2
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter, thought
the actual malice standard should apply. Justice Souter, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor, would have applied a
balancing test to conclude that "the State's interest in enforcing a
newspaper's promise of confidentiality [is] insufficient to outweigh
the interest in unfettered publication of the information revealed."'29
The substance of the dissents implies that the constitutional
protection to which Branzburg alluded is particularly relevant when
newsgathering claims serve as the basis for recovering punitive
damages for intrusion.
Subsequent decisions refusing to privilege the press concerned
access to information rather than recovery of damages for publishing
it. In Houchins v. KQED, the Court upheld restrictions limiting
prison access for both the general public and the press to a monthly
21. Id. at 690.
22. See id. at 681.
23. 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
24. Id. at 670.
25. Id. at 665, 669.
26. Id. at 655.
27. See id. at 674-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 679 (Souter, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 679 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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guided tour and prohibiting all camera equipment on that tour.3
"[Until] the political branches decree otherwise, [the media have] no
right of special access to the [jail] different from or greater than that
accorded the public generally," Justice Burger wrote for a seven-
member Court.31 "[There] is an undoubted right to gather news 'from
any source by means within the law,' but that affords no basis for the
claim that the First Amendment compels others-private persons or
governments-to supply information., 32 Justice Stewart, however,
took issue with the ban on camera equipment.33  The First
Amendment provides adequate justification for treating the press
differently from the general public when laws of general applicability
would preclude newsgathering, he argued in dissent.' "[E]qual access
must be accorded more flexibility in order to accommodate the
practical distinctions between the press and the general public ....
[T]erms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members
of the public may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient
justification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there
to convey to the general public what the visitors see."'3
Similarly, decisions in Pell v. Procunie 6 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post7 upheld generally applicable bans on interviews of
prisoners. The Court reiterated in Pell that although the First
Amendment bars "government from interfering in any way with the
free press," it does not "require government to accord the press
access to information not shared by members of the public
generally., 31 Justice Powell's dissent in Saxbe, however, recognized
that practical differences in the way the press and the public gather
information necessitates preserving rights of access under both the
Free Press and the Free Speech clauses.39 He insisted that an absolute
ban on interviews "impermissibly restrains the ability of the press to
perform constitutionally established functions" of reporting on
30. 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 13(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 665, 681-82(1972)).
33. See icL at 16 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
34. See id.
35. Id
36. 417 U.S. 817,834 (1974).
37. 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974).
38. 417 U.S. at 834.
39. Id. at 857.
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government conduct.4 "I cannot follow the Court in concluding that
any government restriction on press access to information, so long as
it is nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First Amendment
concern," he wrote.41 "At some point official restraints on access to
news sources, even though not directed solely at the press, may so
undermine the function of the First Amendment that it is both
appropriate and necessary to require the Government to justify such
regulations in terms more compelling than discretionary authority
and administrative convenience."
42
When a majority of the Court eventually applied the elusive
constitutional protection for newsgathering alluded to in Branzburg,
it did not recognize a press privilege but a general public right of
access.43 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court held
that the public had a right to attend criminal trials.44 The decision was
a turning point for newsgathering jurisprudence: It recognized that a
law of general application may impermissibly restrict access to
information in violation of the First Amendment, and it reclaimed
access not just for the press but for the public at large. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens characterized the decision as
recognizing for the first time a broad First Amendment right of access
to newsworthy matter. Justice Brennan wrote in another concurring
opinion that the First Amendment "has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of self government ....
The structural model.., entails solicitude not only for
communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of
meaningful communication. 46  Subsequent decisions concerning
access to information expanded this view that the First Amendment
protects all activities essential to operation of a free press. For
example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Court struck
down a Massachusetts law excluding both the press and the general
public from a courtroom during a minor's testimony about alleged sex
offenses. It held that the "First Amendment is... broad enough to




43. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,572 (1980).
44. Id.
45. See id at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the
enjoyment of other First Amendment rights." '48
Thus, the Court's jurisprudence concerning constitutional
protection for newsgathering can be summarized in the following
way: The press is not immune from liability for violating generally
applicable laws, but generally applicable laws must not prevent the
press from performing its essential functions. As will be discussed,49
the Court has further held that where laws create liability based on
publication, the First Amendment requires certain defenses in order
to offset the potential chilling effect on those functions. The
following lower court decisions, however, justified recovery of
publication damages for intrusive newsgathering on the absence of
constitutional protection for newsgathering to justify recovery of
publication damages, without considering that in doing so, they were
actually punishing publication and circumventing its constitutionally
required protections.
B. Does Lack of Constitutional Protection for Newsgathering Justify
Recovery of Punitive damages for intrusion or Broadcast?
If the First Amendment does not protect newsgathering, some
courts have reasoned that plaintiffs can recover for the publication or
broadcast of intrusively gathered information without meeting the
constitutional burden for publication torts. In California, Fairfield v.
American Photocopy Equipment Company set the precedent for
recovery of punitive damages for intrusion in a privacy action:'
Fairfield concerned the privacy tort of appropriation, but it laid the
foundation for recovery of publication damages for violation of other
privacy torts. The appellate court in that case held that damages for
invasion of privacy should include mental suffering and anguish from
publication:
'The gravamen of the action here charged is the injury to the
feelings of the plaintiff, the mental anguish and distress caused
by the publication. In an action of this character, special
damages need not be charged or proven, and if the proof
disclosed a wrongful invasion of the right of privacy, substantial
damages for mental anguish alone may be recovered.'5'
48. Id. The Court applied strict scrutiny to its analysis of the statute and held that a
more narrowly tailored law would allow case-by-case determinations of whether respect
for a minor's privacy merited closure.
49. See Part II.
50. 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 89 (1955).
51. Id. (quoting Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., Inc., 63 Ariz. 294,305-06 (1945)).
[Vol. 27:539
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Perhaps it was logical for the Fairfield court to award punitive
damages for intrusion, because tortious appropriation does not exist
without it. 2 Subsequent courts, however, applied its holding to the
tort of intrusion, even though intrusion does not require publication. 3
For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly
allowed publication to enhance damages for intrusive
newsgathering.m In Dietemann v. Time, Inc., it upheld a damage
award for injury to the plaintiff's "feelings and peace of mind" after
Life Magazine surreptitiously photographed him in his home.5 Police
had suspected Mr. Dietemann of practicing medicine without a
license for attempting to heal people with clay, minerals and herbs.56
Acting in conjunction with police, two Life employees posed as
patients to gain access to Mr. Dietemann's home and photographed
him using a hidden camera. 7 One of the employees said she had a
lump in her breast, and Mr. Dietemann concluded the lump was from
rancid butter eaten 11 years, 9 months and 7 days earlier.8 Life
Magazine ran an article called "Crackdown on Quackery" that
depicted Mr. Dietemann as a quack and included two photographs,
one of which showed Mr. Dietemann with his hand on the upper
portion of the reporter's breast "while he was looking at some
gadgets and holding what appeared to be a wand."59 Mr. Dietemann
sued for invasion of privacy, and the district court awarded him
$1,000 for injury to his "feelings and peace of mind." 6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held the First Amendment did not
immunize the defendant from liability for violating the plaintiffs
privacy in the course of gathering news.61 "The First Amendment has
never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or
crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The First
Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652C (1977).
53. "Despite some variations in the description and the labels applied to the tort [of
invasion of privacy], there is agreement that publication is not a necessary element of the
tort, that the existence of a technical trespass is immaterial, and that proof of special
damages is not required." Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,247 (9th Cir. 1971).
54. See id. at 250.
55. Id. at 245, 250.
56. See iL
57. See id. at 246.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 245-46.
60. Id. at 247.
61. Id. at 249.
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electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office." 2
The court then extended that rationale to allow Mr. Dietemann to
recover for injury from publication of the photographs.6 "No interest
protected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting
damages for intrusion to be enhanced by the fact of later publication
of the information that the publisher improperly acquired. Assessing
damages for the additional emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff
when the wrongfully acquired data are purveyed to the multitude
chills intrusive acts. It does not chill freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment."64
Drawing on this precedent, a California appellate court applied
the same rationale to allow recovery of damages from broadcast in a
trespass claim.' In Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., the court let
the plaintiff recover all damages flowing from NBC's trespass into her
home, including her emotional distress from its broadcast of her
husband's dying moments.6 In that case, an NBC news crew had
accompanied paramedics to the plaintiffs home and videotaped,
without her consent, unsuccessful efforts to resuscitate her husband
after he suffered a heart attack.67 The plaintiff sued NBC for trespass,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and invasion
of privacy after she saw a news report including the video.6 On
appeal of a grant of summary judgment for NBC, the appellate court
held that she had stated a cause of action for trespass, invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.69 It further
held that she could recover for all consequences flowing from trespass
and intrusion,70 including for "her emotional distress when NBC
broadcast her husband's dying moments."'" Both Dietemann and
Miller allowed the plaintiffs to recover for harm from publication or
broadcast. Both decisions involved press intrusions into the home,
where the plaintiffs unquestionably had reasonable expectations of
privacy, as required for tortious intrusion. The obvious privacy
62. Id.
63. See id. at 250.
64. Id.
65. See Miller v. National Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463,1481 (1986).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1469-70, 1474-75.
68. See id. at 1470.
69. See id. at 1481-88.
70. See id at 1481, 1484.
71. Id. at 1481.
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expectation and the highly offensive nature of intrusions into the
home, however, make it difficult to discern whether damages in such
cases stem from the actual intrusion or from a later publication or
broadcast.
C. Where Privacy Expectations Are Uncertain, Damages Likely Flow
from Publication Rather Than Intrusion
More recently, the California Supreme Court has considered
several cases in which it was not clear whether the plaintiffs had the
requisite reasonable expectation of privacy for tortious intrusion.7
For example, in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., the plaintiffs
sued for invasion of privacy after a camera crew videotaped and
broadcast their extrication from a car crash and helicopter rescue.73
On appeal of a grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the
Court held that triable issues of fact concerning whether the plaintiffs
had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in their
conversations with rescue workers while being extricated, and in their
images and conversations while in the helicopter, barred summary
judgment.74
Similarly, in Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
a telephone psychic sued ABC for intrusion, among other claims,
after an undercover reporter recorded their workplace conversations
using a hidden video camera and included a short segment in an
investigative report.S The jury found ABC liable and awarded Mark
72. See Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200 (1998); Sanders v. American
Broad. Cos., 20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999).
73. 18 Cal. 4th at 210-12.
74. See id. at 233,235.
75. Id. at 911-12. In addition to alleging intrusion, the plaintiff alleged violation of
California Penal Code section 632 against secret recording of a confidential
communication. See id. at 912. The statute's definition of confidential communication
excludes communications made in circumstances "in which the parties to the
communication may reasonably expect that the conversation may be overheard or
recorded." § 632(c) (West 1999). The conversations in question took place at a cubicle in
a large room filled with 100 or more such cubicles. See Sanders, 20 Cal. 4th at 912. During
one of the conversations, a passing co-worker joined in. See id. During the other
conversation, a co-worker interrupted to offer a snack. See id. In a special verdict form,
the jury found that the plaintiff did not meet section 632's required expectation of
confidentiality in these conversations. See id. Based on this verdict, the trial court
ordered judgment entered for defendants on the section 632 cause of action. See id. ABC
moved for summary judgment based on its argument that the plaintiff's expectation that
others could hear his recorded conversations barred finding tortious intrusion, which
requires a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id The court denied ABC's motion for
summary judgment, and the jury found ABC liable for invasion of privacy by intrusion.
See id.
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Sanders $335,000 in compensatory and $300,000 in punitive
damages 6 The appellate court reversed, holding that Mr. Sanders
could not expect his conversations at a workplace cubicle to be
private when coworkers could overhear them. It stated that his real
argument was that he had a right not to be videotaped without his
consent, even when he was not in private. On appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that the fact that coworkers might overhear his
conversations did not mean Mr. Sanders lacked any expectation of
privacy.8 It explained that "mass media videotaping may constitute
an intrusion even when the events and communications recorded
were visible and audible to some limited set of observers at the time
they occurred."'79 It held that "the possibility of being overheard by
coworkers does not, as a matter of law, render unreasonable an
employee's expectation that his or her interactions within a nonpublic
workplace will not be videotaped in secret by a journalist."'
While the Court did not explicitly address the propriety of
publication damages in Shulman or Sanders, which both concerned
whether the plaintiffs had enough of a privacy expectation to support
liability for intrusion, it is likely that any injury resulted from the
embarrassment of broadcast or publication rather than the
intrusiveness of a journalist's presence. In fact, in another lawsuit
arising out of the same facts as in Sanders, the plaintiffs admitted in
depositions that their damages were caused solely by the ABC
broadcast rather than the intrusion." "In deposition after deposition,
Plaintiffs state in frank terms that their damages were caused solely
by the ABC broadcast and by nothing else."' The court barred the
76. See id. at 912-13.
77. See id. at 912. The appellate court reasoned that the jury's special verdict that the
plaintiff lacked a reasonable expectation of confidentiality for purposes of section 632
barred finding ABC liable for the tort of intrusion. See id. at 913.
78. See id. at 922. The Court held that the jury's verdict that the conversation was not
confidential for purposes of section 632 did not bar finding a privacy interest sufficient to
support the intrusion claim. See id. at 913-14.
79. Id. at 914.
80. Id. at 919. The Court explicitly avoided holding that employees have a per se
expectation of privacy in the workplace. See Id. The Court also did not decide whether
the intrusion in this particular case was offensive enough to trigger liability. See id. In
fact, it suggested that the offensiveness prong of the intrusion tort may afford a
newsworthiness defense to the media, who could negate an intrusion's offensiveness by
arguing that it was "'justified by the legitimate motive of gathering the news."'
81. See Sussman v. American Broad. Cos., 971 F. Supp. 432, 434 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(citing Dec. of Steven M. Perry).
82. Md
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plaintiffs' recovery of damages from the broadcast, not out of
deference for First Amendment protection but because all damages
arising from the ABC broadcast were time-barred by the Uniform
Publication Act.' In an attempt to avoid summary judgment for
ABC, the plaintiffs submitted new declarations, "created solely for
the purpose of [the summary judgment] motion," alleging injury from
the intrusion.' The court rejected their validity, recognizing that "[i]n
these declarations of convenience, Plaintiffs attempt to salvage a
cause of action that they have all but admitted do [sic] not exist."'
The fact that damages stemmed from the broadcast rather than the
intrusion is not surprising, considering that the courts disagreed over
whether the plaintiffs could expect privacy in the workplace setting at
issue. It is precisely in such cases where constitutional hurdles to
publication damages are most important: Where courts disagree,
journalists must guess about whether an undercover investigation will
subject them to liability. As technological advances force us to
redefine our expectations of privacy, such dilemmas will be more and
more commonplace. Without a breathing space in which to make
such decisions, the result will be a chilling effect on a free press.
H. Barring Recovery of Publication Damages Where Intrusion
Plaintiffs Fail to Clear Constitutional Hurdles
A. The First Amendment Creates Defenses to Libel and Defamation
Because They Punish Publication
Laws that punish publication directly implicate First Amendment
freedom of the press,' not as a general public right but as protection
for an institution. In such cases, constitutional protection may
manifest itself in a variety of forms, from requiring malicious intent
for libel of a public figures to allowing a newsworthiness defense for
publication of private facts.' For example, the Supreme Court in
New York Times v. Sullivan reversed the Alabama Supreme Court
decision affirming liability for an ad,' which criticized those who used
83. See id. at 434.
84. Id.
85. Id. (footnote omitted).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states, in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;..."
87. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,278 (1964).
88. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,491 (1975).
89. Headed "Heed Their Rising Voices," the ad said in part: "In Montgomery, Ala.,
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violence against black demonstrators, on the grounds that it libeled
Montgomery Police Commissioner L. B. Sullivan.9° The ad contained
factual inaccuracies,91 making the only issue under state law whether
it identified and disparaged SullivanY The Court held that in a world
where absolute truth is sometimes impossible to discern under
deadline, even libel must receive some constitutional protection in
order to avoid paralyzing the press. Any other conclusion would
"shackle the First Amendment."'
Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and
protest on one of the major public issues of our time would
seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection.'
4
Upon this platform, the Court held that the First Amendment
excuses some falsehoods in the heat of debate over the conduct of
public officials. Justice Brennan concluded, quoting James Madison,
after students sang 'My Country, 'tis of Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were
expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear gas ringed
the Alabama State College campus. When the entire student body protested to state
authorities by refusing to register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve
them into submission ...
Again and again, the Southern violators have answered Dr. [Martin Luther]
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home
almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him
seven times-for 'speeding,' 'loitering,' and similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged
him with 'perjury,'--a felony under which they could imprison him for 10 years." New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
90. Id. at 278.
91. Witnesses testified that the students had not sung "America" but "The Star-
Spangled Banner." Only nine students were expelled, but not for leading the
demonstration at the Capitol. Only part of the student body had protested the expulsions,
but by boycotting class instead of refusing to register. The campus dining hall was not
padlocked at any time. Police were deployed near the campus, but at no time did they
ring it. Dr. King had been arrested four times, not seven. Although he said he had been
assaulted when he was arrested for loitering outside a courtroom, one of the officers
involved denied that there had been an assault. Dr. King's house had been bombed, but
no evidence ever implicated police. Dr. King was indicted on two counts of perjury, for
which the maximum penalty was five years, not ten, but he had been acquitted on both
charges. See id. at 258-59.
92. Sullivan argued that the ad's general references to "police" pointed a finger at
him as supervisor of the police force. Six witnesses testified that they had read the ad and
concluded it was referring to Sullivan in a derogatory way. See id. at 258.
93. Id. at 266.
94. Id. at 270.
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that "some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
everything; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the
press;" "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and.., it
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need to survive."'95 Thus, the Court held
that public officials alleging libel of public figures must prove that the
press acted with malicious intent-knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for truth or falsity."
B. The First Amendment Allows a Newsworthiness Defense for the
Privacy Tort of Publication of Private Facts
In the context of privacy torts, the First Amendment affords
journalists a defense where publication triggers liability. The United
States Supreme Court has refused to find liability for publication of
private but newsworthy true facts.' Such a defense applied in Cox
Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, where a rape victim sued a television
station for broadcasting her name." In that case, the Court held that
the press was not liable for the publication of accurate information
obtained from open court records.' In another case involving
publication of a rape victim's name, the Court affirmed its aversion
for finding the media liable for publicizing private but newsworthy
information." In Florida Star v. B.J.F., a rape victim sued a
newspaper that mistakenly published her name in a crime report."
The newspaper, which had a nondisclosure policy, obtained the
victim's name from a mistakenly released police report." A man
called B.J.F.'s mother and said he would again rape B.J.F., who
moved and sought psychiatric counseling.Y The Court found that the
newspaper was not liable because where the press "publishes truthful
95. Id. at 271.
96. See id. at 279.
97. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,491 (1975).
98. Id. at 469.
99. See iL at 491.
100. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989) (White, J. dissenting) (arguing
that the Court's decision "obliterate[s] one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the
20th century: the tort of the publication of private facts").
101. IM. at 533.
102. See id The Court found that B.J.F.'s name was lawfully obtained despite the fact
that the police department's release of the information violated a Florida statute, and
despite the fact that the newspaper violated both the Florida statute and its own internal
policies by publishing the information. See id. at 533, 536.
103. See id. at 533.
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information which it lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of
the highest order."'"°
While the Court has refused to find liability for publication of
newsworthy true facts, it has never answered definitively whether the
First Amendment protects publication of invasively gathered
information. In Cox, for example, the Court declined to answer
whether "the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy
free from unwanted publicity."'' 5 Likewise, in Florida Star, the Court
avoided deciding whether truthful publication is always
constitutionally protected and instead barred tort liability under the
facts of the case.""
C. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell Bars Publication Damages for
Violation of Generally Applicable Laws
The United States Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment bars recovering publication damages even where it does
not create immunity against the underlying tort.7  In Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, the magazine ran a parody of a popular liquor
advertisement. 8 The parody depicted the Reverend Jerry Falwell's
first sexual experience as being "a drunken incestuous rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse."'0' Falwell sued the magazine and its
publisher, Larry Flynt, seeking damages for libel, invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 0 At the close of the
evidence, the district court granted Hustler's motion for a directed
verdict on the privacy claim."' The jury found against Falwell on the
libel claim, which requires a false statement of fact, because no
reasonable person would understand the parody as describing actual
facts about Falwell or actual events in which he participated."' The
jury, however, found in Falwell's favor on the emotional distress
claim and awarded compensatory damages of $100,000 and punitive
104. Id. at 554.
105. 420 U.S. at 491.
106. 491 U.S. at 541.
107. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,56 (1988).
108. Id. at 48.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 48-49.
111. See id. at 49.
112. See id.
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damages of $50,000, and the appellate court affirmed."3 It was
obvious that Falwell's emotional distress claim sought "damages for
emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive
to him."'1 4 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Falwell
had to satisfy the heightened burden of proof set forth in New York
Times in order to recover for emotional distress stemming from
publication."5 The Supreme Court first held that the ad parody was
protected expression. 6 It then held that the constitutional libel
standard applied to recovery for emotional distress from publication:
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue
without showing in addition that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e.,
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard as to whether or not it was true."7
The Court's extension of First Amendment protection where
damages flow from publication provides a basis for lower courts to
limit recovery of damages for intrusive newsgathering, despite the
absence of explicit constitutional protection for newsgathering.
D. Lower Courts Have Held Constitutional Protection for Publication
Restricts Damages for Intrusive Newsgathering
Lower courts have applied the constitutional restriction on
recovery of publication damages to a variety of non-publication torts,
from intrusion and trespass to tortious interference with prospective
business advantage. In each of those cases, what triggered First
Amendment protection was the fact that without publication or
broadcast, the plaintiffs could not make a sufficient case for damages.
For example, in Costlow v. Cusimano, the defendant photographed
and distributed pictures of the plaintiffs' children after they had
suffocated in a refrigerator."' The plaintiffs sued for invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of mental distress, and trespass."' The
court applied a newsworthiness defense to the claims for invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress: It barred
113. See id.
114. Id. at 50.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 51-52.
117. Id. at 56.
118. 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (1970).
119. See id. at 94.
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recovery for such claims because the subject matter was "within the
area of legitimate public interest and publication and exhibition of the
story and photographs of the incident accurately portrayed the
events."'20 The court also denied recovery, based on their trespass
claim, of "damages for injury to reputation and for emotional
disturbance....' In doing so, it rejected the plaintiffs' theory that such
damages were a natural consequence of the trespass." It held that
"[s]ince the tort of trespass is designed to protect interest in
possession of property, damages for trespass are limited
consequences flowing from the interference with possession and not
for separable acts more properly allocated under other categories of
liability. '121
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the argument
that injury to reputation resulted from intrusive newsgathering rather
than a subsequent broadcast. In Desnick v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., ABC sent test patients to surreptitiously photograph
their conversations with ophthalmologists alleged to have prescribed
unnecessary cataract surgeries.24 The ophthalmologists sued ABC for
defamation, trespass, invasion of privacy, illegal wiretapping and
fraud."z On appeal of dismissal for failure to state a claim, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the trespass claim because
ABC's test patients had only entered clinics open to the public and
videotaped their own conversations with the ophthalmologists; thus,
the court held "there was no invasion.., of any of the specific
interests that the tort of privacy seeks to protect."'2 6 The court barred
the privacy claims because the recorded conversations did not reveal
private facts and were recorded by participants.27 Likewise, it
recognized that the federal wiretapping statute allows one party to
record a conversation with impunity, unless his purpose is to commit
a crime or a tort." The Court further held that ABC's purpose was
exposure of misconduct, which is not a crime or a tort, "even if the
120. Id.
121. Id at 97.
122. See id-
123. Id.
124. 44 F.3d 1345, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 1352.
127. See id. at 1353.
128. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 211(2)(d) (West 2000)).
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program as it was eventually broadcast was tortious."'29 Finally, the
Court rejected the fraud claim, because plaintiffs had failed to show a
scheme to defraud as required under state law."' In closing, the
Court noted that claims targeting the program's production, as
opposed to its content, could not entirely skirt First Amendment
protection:
Today's "tabloid" style investigative television reportage,
conducted by networks desperate for viewers in an increasingly
competitive television market constitutes-although it is often
shrill, one-sided, and offensive, and sometimes defamatory-an
important part of that market. It is entitled to all the safeguards
with which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for
defamation. And it is entitled to them regardless of the name
of the tort, and, we add, regardless of whether the tort suit is
aimed at the content of the broadcast or the production of the
broadcast.31
If constitutional protection applies to newsgathering claims
where damage flows from publication, then it certainly applies to
torts besides libel arising from publication. A New York district court
applied such protection in Aequitron Medical, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.32
In that case, CBS broadcast a report on allegedly defective baby
heart and respiration monitors produced by the plaintiffs, who sued
for defamation and tortious interference with prospective business
advantage, among other claims.133  The court dismissed the
defamation claim for lack of personal jurisdiction."M Concerning the
claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage, it
applied the "actual malice" and "clear and convincing evidence"
standards because the claim arose from allegedly defamatory
conduct. 35 Otherwise, every defamation plaintiff could raise a claim
129. Id. at 1353. The Court had held that the defendants had stated a claim for
defamation, so the broadcast might yet prove tortious. Id. at 1349-51.
130. See id. at 1354-55.
131. Id. at 1355 (footnotes omitted).
132. 964 F. Supp. 704,709-718 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
133. See id. at 708.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 709-18. Although only a public figure or official suing for libel must prove
actual malice, the court recognized that "[u]nder Minnesota law, the 'actual malice'
standard also applies when a corporate plaintiff sues a media defendant, if the defamatory
material 'concerns matters of legitimate public interest in the geographic area in which the
defamatory material is published, either because of the nature of the business conducted
or because the public has an especially strong interest in the investigation at issue."' Id at
711 (quoting Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 487-88 (Minn.
1985) (footnotes omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 390 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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of wrongful interference, and thereby make an end run around the
constitutional limitations placed on the law of defamation. 13 6 The
Court then analyzed each of the allegedly defamatory statements and
held either that they were substantially true, or that the plaintiff could
not show that they were made with actual maliceY
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit held the First Amendment
bars recovery for injury to reputation from broadcast of information
obtained through breach of a duty of loyalty.'38 In Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., two ABC reporters used false resumes to get
jobs at Food Lion, Inc. supermarkets and then secretly videotaped
unwholesome food handling practices. 139 Food Lion's suit against
ABC and the reporters did not claim defamation but instead focused
on how the information was gathered: Food Lion sued for fraud,
breach of duty of loyalty, trespass, and unfair trade practices. Food
Lion won at trial, and the jury awarded it $1,400 in compensatory
damages on its fraud claim and $1 each on its duty of loyalty and
trespass claims.14' The jury then awarded Food Lion $5,545,750 in
punitive damages.142  The district court held that such punitive
damages were excessive, and Food Lion accepted a remittitur to
$315,000.43 ABC appealed the district court's denial of its motion for
judgment as a matter of law, and Food Lion appealed the court's
ruling that barred its recovery of publication damages." 4
The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment that ABC committed
fraud and unfair trade practices. 45 It held that Food Lion failed to
show reasonable reliance on the reporters' misrepresentations: Food
Lion could not recover administrative costs from training the
reporters because it did not have any guarantee that they would work
for a set period of time.46 Further, it could not recover the wages it
had paid the reporters because it had not paid them on reliance of the
136. See Aequitron, 964 F. Supp. at 709.
137. See id2 at 712-18.
138. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522-24 (7th Cir.
1999).
139. Id. at 510.





145. See id. at 514.
146. See id. at 513-14.
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misrepresentations but for the work they performed.47 The court
therefore reversed the award of $1,400 in compensatory damages
against ABC.
Next, the court considered the claim that the ABC reporters
breached their duty of loyalty to Food Lion.'" It looked at the
following traditional bases for finding a breach of such duty: (1) the
employee competes directly with her employer, (2) the employee
misappropriates her employer's profits, property or business
opportunities, or (3) the employee breaches her employer's
confidences.'49 Based on these grounds, it extrapolated that the
reporters' conduct verged "on the kind of employee activity that has
already been determined to be tortious" because "the reporters-in
promoting the interests of one master, ABC, to the detriment of a
second, Food Lion-committed the tort of disloyalty against Food
Lion."'5 "The interests of the employer (ABC) to whom Dale and
Barnett gave complete loyalty were adverse to the interests of Food
Lion, the employer to whom they were unfaithful. ABC and Food
Lion were not business competitors, but they were adverse in a
fundamental way.''.
The court then affirmed the district court's judgment for Food
Lion on the trespass claim. It refused to base its holding on the fact
that the reporters had gained access to food handling areas of the
supermarket through misrepresentation, recognizing that even
consent gained through misrepresentation is sometimes sufficient.'52
Otherwise, "a restaurant critic could not conceal his identity when he
ordered a meal, or a browser pretended to be interested in
merchandise that he could not afford to buy. Dinner guests would be
trespassers if they were false friends who never would have been
invited had the host known their true character, and a consumer who
in an effort to bargain down an automobile dealer falsely claimed to
be able to buy the same car elsewhere at a lower price would be a
trespasser in a dealer's showroom."'5 3 Rather, the court held that the
reporters' breach of duty of loyalty vitiated its consent to enter Food
147. See id.
148. See id. at 515-16.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 516.
151. Id. at 519.
152. See id. at 517-18 (citing Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351-52
(7th Cir. 1995)).
153. Id. at 517.
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Lions' non-public food handling areas."' "The breach of duty of
loyalty-triggered by the filming in non-public areas, which as
adverse to Food Lion-was a wrongful act in excess of [the
reporters'] authority to enter Food Lion's premises as employees.""15
The court rejected ABC's argument that Food Lion's claims
were subject to First Amendment scrutiny."6 It recognized that
"there are 'First Amendment interests in newsgathering" '157 and that
"'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated.""58 However, it relied on the Supreme
Court's rule that "'generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news' to hold
that the First Amendment does not bar holding ABC liable for
breach of duty of loyalty or trespass.'59 It therefore affirmed the
damages award against ABC for these torts in the amount of $2 .
60
Finally, the court considered Food Lion's appeal of the district
court's refusal to let it recover, based on non-reputational tort claims,
for injury to its reputation from the broadcast. 6' Food Lion sought
publication damages for loss of goodwill and lost sales following
broadcast of the report.'62 The district court had reasoned that such
damages resulted from Food Lion's food handling practices, "not the
method by which they were recorded or published."' 63 The court thus
held that the non-reputational torts on which Food Lion based its
claim did not proximately cause the publication damages." The
Seventh Circuit also barred Food Lion's recovery of publication
damages, but on other grounds. The court held that "an overriding
(and settled) First Amendment principle precludes the award of
publication damages in this case."' 6 Namely, "Food Lion attempted
to avoid the First Amendment limitations on defamation claims by
154. See id. at 518-19.
155. Id. at 518.
156. See id at 520-21.
157. Id. (citing In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 855 (4th Cir. 1992) (Wilkinson J.,
concurring)).
158. Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
159. Id.
160. See id. at 522.
161. See id at 522-24.
162. See id. at 522.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 522-24.
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seeking publication damages under non-reputational tort claims,
while holding to the normal state law proof standards for these
torts.' ' 6 The court held that such a result was precluded by the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell.67 Relying on that decision, the court reiterated that "when a
public figure plaintiff uses a law to seek damages resulting from
speech covered by the First Amendment, the plaintiff must satisfy the
proof standard of New York Times. ' '
The court pointed to the fact that Food Lion acknowledged it did
not sue for defamation because it could not prove ABC acted with
actual malice.69 In other words, Food Lion could not prove that ABC
had made a false statement of fact with knowledge that it was false or
reckless disregard for whether it was true or false.Y "What Food
Lion sought to do, then, was to recover defamation-type damages
under non-reputational tort claims, without satisfying the stricter
(First Amendment) standards of a defamation claim. We believe that
such an end-run around the First Amendment strictures is foreclosed
by Hustler..'.' Thus, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the First
Amendment protects against punishing publication, even where the
underlying claim allegedly targets intrusive newsgathering.
Conclusion: Courts Should Apply the Actual Malice Standard
to Recovery of Publication Damages for Intrusive
Newsgathering
Decisions that allow recovery of punitive damages for intrusion
or broadcast, based on intrusive newsgathering, allow plaintiffs to
circumvent constitutional hurdles to liability based on publication.
Such decisions often cite United States Supreme Court precedent that
the First Amendment does not grant journalists immunity against
generally applicable laws as justification for recovery of publication
damages in intrusive newsgathering cases. They fail, however, to
reconcile ambiguous protection for newsgathering with explicit
protection for publication. In contrast, decisions imposing a
heightened burden of proof for recovery of publication damages,
166. Id. at 522.
167. Id. (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
168. Id.
169. See id. (citing Appellee's Opening Br. at 44).
170. See id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964)).
171. Id.
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regardless of the nature of the underlying claim, preserve
constitutional protection for publication. Thus, this note advocates
applying the actual malice and clear and convincing evidence
standards to restrict recovery of publication damages for intrusive
newsgathering.
